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ABSTRACT
We evaluate agriculturalbank managementperformance, focusing on the impacts of in-
terstatebanking laws on productivity change. The generalized Malmquist productivity in-
dex decomposes productivity change into technological change, technical efficiency
change, and change in scale economies. While managerialproductivity rose from 1982 to
1991, statesthatadopted the most liberal interstatebanking laws experienced the greatest
improvement in productivity. Large agriculturalbanks were more efficient in statesthat
had more liberalized interstatebanking laws while small agriculturalbanks fared betterin
stateswith more restrictive laws.
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Before 1978, no state permitted out-of-state
acquisitions of its banks. Within 25 years the
interstate banking regulations that had been in
place for over a century disappeared as states
adopted liberalized interstate banking laws.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 allows
banks to branch across state borders after June
1997 if states concur. Deregulation which had
proceeded as a state and regional initiative ef-
fectively shifted to a uniform federal policy.
Policy analysts and state legislators continue
to examine whether these provisions benefit or
hurt banks in their states.
The main objective of this study is to eval-
uate changes in the productivity of agricultural
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bank management linked to the banking de-
regulation using the generalized Malmquist in-
dex. This index enables us to investigate the
contribution of scale economies to productiv-
ity change. For agricultural banks in states that
had some form of interstate banking law prior
to the Riegle-Neal Act, we estimate productiv-
ity change focusing on the impacts of inter-
state banking laws on the economies of scale
and managerial productivity change. We ex-
amine the impacts of relaxing government re-
strictions on structural changes in agricultural
banking by applying the generalized Malm-
quist index which explicitly incorporates the
influence of scale economies on productivity
change.
The survival of small local banks has been
vital to the economic and social development
of rural areas. Opponents of interstate banking
assert that this policy could lead to the erec-
tion of new entry barriers. When large bank-438 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
ing organizations acquire local banks and
grow in market share, these institutions may
apply newly acquired market power to carry
out predator y pricing. This drives smaller
competitors from the market and prevents the
entry of new firms. With the concentration of
local markets, banks with large market shares
can increase fees on services, increase loan
rates, and reduce rates of deposits, denying the
public the benefits of more intense competi-
tion among suppliers of financial services.
Thus, removing restrictions on interstate bank-
ing and branching might cause small banks to
gradually disappear.
Supporters of interstate banking contend
that removing interstate banking restrictions
would result in the entry of more efficient
banks into local markets where previously
sheltered banks earn excess profits. Propo-
nents argue that an intensified level of com-
petition will eliminate inefficient banks and
improve the quality and availability of finan-
cial services for consumers and small busi-
nesses.
The importance of the new regulatory re-
gime is illustrated by examining the dramatic
reductions in the number of agricultural banks.
From 1980 to 1991, agricultural banks de-
clined from 5,316 to 3,952 as 350 agricultural
banks failed and 950 either consolidated or
merged. Sixty-four banks were taken over by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
which allowed solvent banks to take over con-
trol of the assets of the failed banks even
across state lines.
Bank mergers have been justified by the
existence of scale and scope economies. By
contrast most studies of bank costs find in-
creasing returns to scale only for small banks
with less than $100 million in total assets and
decreasing returns to scale for larger banks.
Measuring the impacts of these changes on the
performance of banks is critical given recent
structural and legislative developments. Pro-
ductivity measures that explicitly account for
the impacts of scale economies will enable
legislators and banking analysts to identify
whether productivity changes are mainly driv-
en by technical efficiency changes, changes in
technology or movement toward operation at
an optimal scale.
Regulatory Environment and Literature
Review
In this section we briefly describe the origins
and development of banking regulation along
with the types of interstate banking laws that
have been adopted by states. We summarize
key studies examining the impacts of interstate
banking on the structure and the profitability
of the commercial banking industry and the
effects of interstate banking on managerial
skill. The analysis identifies key variables used
in previous studies and the role of data aggre-
gation in measuring the interstate banking im-
pacts.
The first federal legislation focusing on the
geographic scope of bank operations was the
McFadden Act, passed in 1927 and amended
in 1933, which permitted national banks the
same branching opportunities that states al-
lowed their state-chartered banks. Bank hold-
ing companies (BHCS) are banks that own one
or more other banks and offer bankers an or-
ganizational form to circumvent intrastate
branching restrictions. The Douglas Amend-
ment of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 prohibited BHCS from acquiring banks
in other states unless those states specifically
allowed such acquisitions. The McFadden Act
and the Douglas Amendment implied the right
of each state to determine a legally enforce-
able position on interstate banking expansion.
By 1991, different forms of interstate bank-
ing laws had been adopted in the United
States. The approaches to interstate legislation
generally fit one of three basic categories: na-
tionwide open-entry, national reciprocity, or
regional reciprocity. Nationwide open-entry
permitted acquisitions and other activities by
bank holding companies found anywhere in
the nation. This was the most liberal form of
interstate banking law and the majority of the
states in this group were found in the West.
Reciprocity meant that out-of-state BHCS
could make acquisitions in a given state only
if those out-of-state BHCS were in states that
granted similar privileges to BHCS in the otherArmah, Park, and L.ovell: Performance of Agricultural Bank Management 439
state. States that adopted the national reci-
procity law were not aligned in any distinct
geographic pattern across the United States.
Regional reciprocity meant that interstate
banking was limited only to states specified in
the state legislation and reciprocity was re-
quired. These compacts were usually limited
to adjacent states or those next to the adjacent
states. Most Southern states, including Ala-
bama, Arkansas, and Georgia adopted this
law. States that had not adopted any form of
interstate banking law consisted mostly of
Midwestern states with a large scale of agri-
cultural activity.
Lence (1997) summarizes key trends influ-
encing the structure of the banking industry
since 1980, highlighting the role of economic
forces driven by bank efficiency, market pow-
er, and portfolio diversification along with
government forces such as the relaxation of
branching and interstate banking restrictions.
Most of the studies listed were based on in-
dividual bank data.
Our analysis is based on state-level data to
measure the impact of state characteristics as
key determinants of bank efficiency. Panel
data allow us to evaluate the impact of policy
initiatives and shifting state regulatory strate-
gies across cross-sectional units over time.
States did not uniformly and consistently
adopt similar banking regulations. By April 1,
1989 seven states, including California, Col-
orado, and Pennsylvania had some form of re-
gional interstate banking law. In March 1990,
Pennsylvania adopted national reciprocity
while California and Colorado adopted the
same law in January, 1991. By observing
these units over different points in time, panel
data allow us to separate the effects of scale
economies and technological change on pro-
ductivity. The availability of extended panels
of state-level data permits us to focus on the
sources of productivity changes identified in
the generalized Malmquist index.
Other researchers have conducted studies
concerning the impacts of the new intrastate
branching and interstate banking laws on com-
mercial banks. Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise
undertake simulations using commercial bank
data aggregated nationally from 1979 to 1994
which suggest that nationwide banking will re-
sult in substantial consolidation of the banking
industry. The study concludes that little
change will occur in the distribution of indus-
try assets across organization size. Chong in-
vestigates the impacts of interstate banking on
commercial banks’ risk and profitability using
capital market data and the event study meth-
odology. The evidence shows that interstate
banking improves the profitability of commer-
cial banks and is associated with significant
increases in the banks’ exposure to market
risk.
Hubbard and Palia examine whether a
more competitive environment requires great-
er management skills in chief executive offi-
cers using interstate bank regulation as a mea-
sure of competitive conditions. Interstate
regulations with fewer entry barriers lead to a
higher level of potential competition and de-
mand managers with greater skills, resulting
in higher compensation levels for these man-
agers. This evidence indicates that a more
competitive environment creates the need for
managers with greater managerial talent who
can enhance the bank’s competitive position.
Swamy et al. investigate the determinants
of U.S. commercial bank performance from
1980 to 1993 using state-level commercial
bank data on rates of return on assets (ROA)
and equities (ROE). Explanatory variables
include bank-specific variables, location re-
striction variables and a variable to measure
general economic conditions. Locational re-
strictions such as barriers to entry significantly
improve commercial bank profits. Berger also
used ROA and ROE in evaluating the banking
industry,
Studies determining the impacts of the
banking and branching restrictions have typi-
cally employed data aggregated at various lev-
els such as industry, state, and national levels.
Wallace uses state-level data to analyze struc-
tural and efficiency changes in financial per-
formance across agricultural and nonagricul-
tural banks from 1980 to 1991. Although
significant consolidation has occurred, small
agricultural banks have stayed competitive and
outperformed nonagricultural banks on several440 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
measures of profitability, liquidity, efficiency,
and solvency.
McLaughlin uses aggregated bank holding
company (BHC) data to examine the impacts
of interstate banking and branching reform on
the BHCS. Observed changes in bank behavior
following liberalization of state branching and
interstate banking from 1988 to 1993 show
that BHCS responded quickly to state branch-
ing liberalization by consolidating their banks
within states. However, the BHCS were slower
to respond to interstate banking reforms to ex-
pand into additional states.
Mengle’s analysis is based on individual
and aggregated bank data to show that inter-
state branching is a logical and feasible step
in the evolution of the geographical structure
of American banking. The study outlines some
arguments for interstate branching and then
discusses ways of application, the likelihood
of adoption, and possible effects on the bank
structure in the United States. Mengle con-
cludes that both banks and consumers would
benefit from such a law and suggests that the
number of large banks would decrease while
small bank numbers would likely remain un-
changed.
Model Development
Economies, Hubbard, and Palia develop a
model of monopolistic competition between
large and small banks that highlights the link
between performance measurement and inter-
state banking restrictions. We outline the main
features of the model here, focusing on its test-
able implications for assessing managerial per-
formance in agricultural banks. Assume there
are M banking markets with m participating
banks in each market. Competition between
banks takes place in a three-stage sequential
model of a differentiated products markets:
banks enter, choose locations, and choose pric-
es.
Small banks participate in only one market
while large banks participate in g markets as
the degree of competition in each market is
defined by the number of participants. The
model determines the equilibrium price and
number of banks and a profit function for each
type of bank. The profits of bank i in market
j are H,J (Pj; gi, m), where Pj = (Pi,j, . . . . P~,J)
is the vector of prices charged by all banks in
this market, and g, is the number of markets
in which the bank participates. The profits of
bank i in market j are decreasing in the num-
ber of competitors in that market. Profits of
small banks depend on one market only. Prof-
its per branch of large banks participating in
g~ markets are
‘IIH,,,(p,; at m)
(1) n’ (F’gh, m) = ,? gh
where P is a vector of all prices for all markets
in which the large bank participates which
range from 1 to g~.
Depositors are informed about bank prof-
itability by identifying banks that operate in
multiple markets. Large banks have lower lev-
els of profit variability than smaller banks due
to their ability to diversify their portfolios
across multiple markets. This risk-pooling ar-
gument applies even if all markets represent
identical distributions. Drawing from econom-
ic activity across geographic markets that are
negatively correlated is an additional factor
that lowers the variability of profits for large
banks relative to small banks.
To attract additional deposits, banks that
operate in only one market respond by holding
more capital per dollar of assets than banks
operating in many markets. Small banks hold
more equity capital per branch than large
banks because they are not as diversified.
Large banks with branches in multiple markets
have higher expected profits than small banks
in any market in which both types of banks
participate.
Figure 1 presents a graphical depiction of
the profit functions of large and small banks
for the regimes when interstate branching is
prohibited and when nationwide open entry is
allowed. With no restrictions on interstate
banking, the free-entry equilibrium is deter-
mined by the zero-profit condition for large
banks. Profits of large banks facing no inter-
state banking restrictions are I& and the free-
entry equilibrium number of banks is given byArmah, Park, and Lovell: Pe#ormance of Agricultural Bank Management 441
BankProfits
l-i’ NB = Profitsof largebankswithno branchingrestrictions.
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Figure 1. Profit functions of large and small
~~B = O. At this level of competition small
banks have losses, II; <0, depicted in Figure
1 as the segment E17 Large banks under a re-
gime of interstate branching restrictions have
profits of I&. Small bank losses under inter-
state branching are larger than under a regime
of branching restrictions as EF is longer than
CD.
Under the most severe entry restrictions no
interstate banks enter and the zero-profit con-
dition of small banks determines the number
of banks in each market. The profit function
for small banks in Figure 1 illustrates the equi-
librium. Small banks make zero profits and
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banks under regulatory restrictions
survive. For small banks to survive under a
regime of branching restrictions, the number
of banks must be reduced to point A. Large
banks with multiple branches reap positive
profits indicated by the segment AB so that
11~ > 0. Under the regime of no branching
restrictions profits of large banks are higher
compared to when branching restrictions are
in place as the segment AZ is longer than the
segment AB.
The model yields a set of testable predic-
tions for assessing banking performance. In
the absence of banking restrictions the com-
petitive position of small banks is eroded. In442 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
markets where small banks are dominant,
Economies, Hubbard, and Palia suggest that
interstate banking regulation allows small
banks to deter entry by large banks. These re-
sults imply that assessments of bank perfor-
mance and productivity should be based on
profitability measures plus characteristics spe-
cific to the environment in which banks op-
erate.
Measuring Productivi~ Change Using the
Generalized Malmquist Productivity Index
The technical efficiency of a production unit
is a comparison between observed and optimal
values of its output and input. This compari-
son can take the form of the ratio of observed
to maximum potential output obtainable from
the given input. Alternatively, we may define
the comparison as the ratio of minimum po-
tential to observed input required to produce
the given output, or some combination of the
two.
In this section, we discuss the generalized
Malmquist productivity index which we use to
measure and decompose bank management
productivity change into technical efficiency
change, technological change, and change in
scale economies. The generalized Malmquist
index proposed and implemented by Grifell-
Tatj6 and Lovell explicitly incorporates the in-
fluence of scale economies on productivity
change and accounts for three key components
of efficiency changes over time.
First, banking firms undergo changes in
technical efficiency over time as they respond
to competitive pressures and adjust marketing
strategies. Index E accounts for this compo-
nent which is due to managerial efficiency and
reflects productivity change arising from
changes in the manager’s technical efficiency
between tand t + 1. This index E measures a
firm catching up to the best-practice frontier
and represents technical efficiency change.
Second, firms adopt innovative technolog-
ical and marketing techniques and induce the
frontier technology to shift outward over time.
The index T captures the activities and per-
formance of the best-practice firms in adopting
and managing new technology between the
two periods resulting in shifts in the produc-
tion frontier (innovation). The index T mea-
sures the contribution to productivity change
due to any technical change in the industry.
Third, large banks may achieve economies
of scale over time as they spread productive
resources over multiple products more effi-
ciently. Managers may exploit these efficien-
cies to combine a bank and an insurance agen-
cy and sell loans, acquire deposits, and market
insurance policies in one organization. The
scale index S measures this third component
and attains a value greater than unity if a
change in the producer’s scale of production
contributes positively to productivity change.
A change in the scale of production positively
affects productivity change if it is a movement
toward the technically optimal scale. The in-
dex of change in scale economies ensures that
the generalized Malmquist index does not
overstate productivity change when input
growth occurs in the presence of decreasing
returns to scale.
Let X’t = (x’/, . . . . x~) a O denote an (N X
1) vector of inputs and y“ = (y\’, . . . . y~) =
O represent an (M X 1) vector of outputs for
producer i=l, . . .. Iinperiodt =1, . . ..T.
An output-oriented generalized Malmquist in-
dex of productivity for producer i between pe-
riod t and t + 1, using period t technology as
a reference can be expressed as
(2) G,(x,t, y“, X“+l,Ytl+l)= E.T. $
where, the right-hand side elements in equa-
tion (2) are
‘3) ‘=m:::’:~’)l
‘= I:+XX3 s= [
WX”+’, Y“) D’(x”, Y“)1 D’(x”+’ , y“) D:(x”, Y’t)“
The calculation and decomposition of the
generalized Malmquist index requires the cal-
culation of six output distance functions for
each cross-sectional unit. The within-periodArmah, Park, and Lovell: Performance of Agricultural Bank Managetnent 443
output distance function D~(x’t,y’t) for produc-
er i in period t is obtained from the following
linear programming model:
(4) [D’(x”, y“)]-’ = max 0
subject to
(5) ey: s ~ z“y~,
~ zJtx{ 5::,
z]t ~ o ~z,t= 1,
J
m=l, . . ..M
n=l, . . ..N
‘j=l, . . .. I
where the zJt isan activity variable. The struc-
ture of the best practice technology available
in period t is characterized by the constraints
of the problem. The technology described by
the program satisfies convexity, strong dispos-
ability of output and inputs, and variable re-
turns to scale.
The objective of the problem is to achieve
the maximum feasible radial expansion in the
outputs of producer i without violating best
practice. Producer i is pronounced technically
efficient if the maximum is unity; for any
maximum greater than unity, the producer is
viewed as technically inefficient, The problem
is solved I times, once for each producer in
the sample period t, resulting in technical ef-
ficiency scores for each producer and yielding
the values of the I output distance functions
Dt(xlt, ylt) in period t.
The remaining five output distance func-
tions which make up the generalized Malm-
quist productivity index are calculated in a
similar way by modifying the constraints of
the problem. identified in (4) and (5). For ex-
ample, the convexity constraint identified as
the fourth constraint in equation set (5) is de-
leted to calculate the constant returns to scale
distance functions D~(x”, Y“) and D~(x”+’, y“).
The mixed distance function D’(x”+ 1, y’t+1 )
is estimated by comparing observations in pe-
riod t + 1 with the best-practice frontier of
period t.D’+’ (x”, y“) uses data from both pe-
riods to evaluate (xt, yt) relative to technology
constructed from t + 1 data. In estimating the
distance functions for the index of scale econ-
omy change, D:(x’t+ i, ylt) evaluates data com-
prising period t+ 1 inputs and period toutputs
using period t technology. The subscript c
shows that the distance function is defined rel-
ative to some constant returns to scale tech-
nology. Dt(xt+’, yl) performs the same evalu-
ation as D~(x”-”, y“) to a variable returns to
scale technology.
After solving these six linear programming
problems for each set of observations, we in-
sert the values into equation (2) to obtain the
generalized Malmquist index and its compo-
nents. An index below unity shows a decline
in productivity while a value exceeding 1 sug-
gests growth.
Data and Variables
This section discusses the data and measures
of inputs and outputs used in the analysis. The
estimates of the productivity indexes were
based on annual statewide aggregate data for
agricultural banks for 1982 and 1991 using in-
formation on the agricultural and nonagricul-
tural banking performance from Wallace. We
focus on data that were available for 36 states
for both sample periods, building on the in-
sights presented by Swamy et al. and Berger,
Hanweck, and Humphrey who also used state-
level data in their analyses of U.S. commercial
banks.
Banks consolidate or merge to ensure an
increase in present or future profits. They op-
erate in markets and engage in activities that
boost their current or future profits. We mea-
sure managerial performance using profitabil-
ity measures consistent with Swamy et al. and
Boyd and Gertler. Managers of financial insti-
tutions and other industry professionals eval-
uate bank performance based on financial ra-
tios derived from balance sheets and income
statements. Profitability ratios measure the
ability of the firm to produce net returns suf-
ficient to sustain survival and growth and
serve as an indicator of bank management’s
response to changing market conditions.
The output variables chosen for this study
are two ratios drawn from the profitability
measures—the rate of return on assets (ROA)
and the rate of return on equity (ROE). The444 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999




Efficiency Technological Net of Scale Malmquist
States Change Index Change Index Effects Scale Index Index
All Regimes 1.067 1.283 1.369 1.017 1.393
Idaho 1.611 0.978 1.576 1.400 2.205
Oklahoma 1.184 1.476 1.748 1.184 2.069
Texas 0.924 1.108 1.024 1.023 1.047
Utah 1.560 1.198 1.869 1.583 2.957
Wyoming 1.047 0.978 1.024 1.047 1.071
Geometric Mean 1.235 1.116 1.379 1.229 1.695
return on assets is calculated as profits per dol-
lar of assets and provides a gauge of how well
a bank’s management uses its assets. Together
with the risk profile, ROA can be employed
in assessing a bank’s ability to absorb losses
before its capital position is threatened.
We select state-level factors that potentially
affect the loan base of agricultural banks as
inputs. This set of state variables includes the
average farm size, the number of farms, the
average market value of agricultural products
sold, the average value of Commodity Credit
Corporation loans received, the average value
of land and buildings, and the average value
of equipment and machinery per farm. These
factors largely affect the borrowers’ equity po-
sitions and their loan repayment abilities.
Bank management attempts to harness these
local attributes of the agricultural sector in the
efficient operation of their institutions.
Results and Discussion
In this section we examine productivity
change and its components for agricultural
bank management under each interstate bank-
ing regime. The effects of shifts in technical
efficiency, technological change, and the im-
pact of scale economies on productivity
change are presented to assess how these ef-
fects are related to interstate banking regimes.
The analysis highlights the bias caused by ne-
glecting the role of scale economies in pro-
ductivity change.
Table 1 summarizes the geometric means
of managerial productivity change and its
components for the different banking regimes.
We also calculate the index of productivity
change and evaluate the changes in its com-
ponents for the individual states under each
interstate banking regime in Tables 1 to 4.
For all agricultural banks the generalized
Malmquist productivity index revealed that
productivity rose by 39.3 percent from 1982
to 1991. The primary source of productivityy
growth was due to technological progress
which increased by 28.3 percent, indicated in
Column 2 of Table 1. More significantly, the
remaining managers were more than able to
keep up with the improvements in best prac-
tice as evidenced by the 6.7-percent increase
in managerial efficiency displayed in Column
1 of Table 1. These results indicate that agri-
cultural bank managers adapted well to the
more liberalized regulatory climate. A positive
relationship exists between size and productiv-
ity change and may explain the redistribution
of banks to higher size classes as managers
capture economies of scale.
The expanded scale of potential entrants in-
creased competition in the market for agricul-
tural lending. We use the term “potential en-
trants” because some states were due to
permit bank entry from more states outside
their previously defined region. For instance,
Colorado was scheduled to switch from re-
gional reciprocal interstate banking to nation-
wide banking by July 1993. Kansas and New
Mexico, states that permitted no form of in-
terstate banking, had committed to adopt re-Armah, Park, ana! Lovell: Pe#ormance of Agricultural Bank Management 445
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gional reciprocal and nationwide interstate recorded a scale index of 1 as found in Col-
banking laws respectively by July, 1992. Man- umn 4 of Table 2, efficiency was mainly due
agers of larger banks more efficiently em- to diversification of outputs and inputs under
ployed local resources in the operation of their constant returns to scale. Here, small and large
institutions. For banks in states such as Ken- agricultural banks could easily coexist since
tucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia that the size of the bank yielded no advantages.




Efficiency Technological Net of Scale Malmquist
States Change Index Change Index Effects Scale Index Index
All Regimes 1.067 1.283 1.369 1.017 1.393
Arkansas 1.267 1.329 1.685 0.946 1.594
Colorado 1.038 1.060 1,100 1.060 1.166



















Missouri 1.175 1.146 1.347 1.058 1.424
Tennessee 0.938 1.428 1.340 0.938 1.257
Virginia 1.131 1.478 1.672 0.999 1.669
Wisconsin 0.964 1.436 1.384 1.017 1.409
Geometric Mean 1.011 1.365 1.379 0.968 1.335446 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999




Efficiency Technological Net of Scale Malmquist
States Change Index Change Index Effects Scale Index Index
All Regimes 1.067 1.283 1.369 1.017 1.393
Montana 1.140 1.108 1.263 1.136 1.434
New Mexico 0.699 1.015 0.710 1.034 0.734
Geometric Mean 1.032 1.148 1.185 1.151 1.364
For banks in states with nationwide open
entry, the fifth column of Table 1 shows that
productivity rose by 69.5 percent with an av-
erage scale index of 1.229 (Column 4, Table
1). This suggests a positive relationship be-
tween size and productivity change as large
banks were more efficient under these com-
petitive conditions than small banks. This
finding is consistent with the results of Bil-
lingsley and Lamy that larger BHCS were ex-
pected to reap greater benefits from nation-
wide interstate banking. Technological
improvements for banks under this regime
were slower than in any other group at 11.6
percent. The measure of technical efficiency
change indicates that bank managers kept up
with improving technology at a faster rate
(23.5%) than those in more restrictive banking
regimes.
Productivity changes for states with nation-
al and regional reciprocity laws were lower.
For agricultural banks in states with national
reciprocity (Table 2), the improvement was
36.1 percent while that for agricultural banks
in regional reciprocity (Table 3) states was
33.5 percent. Restrictions on entry by banks
from other states may have limited potential
or actual competition. As a result local banks
may have gained an increase in market power
and did not have to operate at the most effi-
cient level to increase their levels of profit. We
observe that the average scale indices were
0.974 in states with national reciprocity and
0.968 in states with regional reciprocity indi-
cating that more restrictive conditions seemed
to favor small agricultural banks.
Featherstone and Moss (1994) estimate
economies of scale and scope in agricultural
banking by disaggregating outputs used in ag-
ricultural lending. Based on 1990 Call Reports
from 7,108 rural or agricultural banks, they
report an overall economies-of-scale measure
of 0.986, indicating nearly constant returns to
scale. Economies of scale are exhausted at
bank sizes exceeding $60 million. This result
is consistent with the measures obtained here
for banks operating under the more restrictive
banking regimes where scale economy mea-
sures of 0.974 and 0.968 were obtained. Both
findings suggest that restrictive interstate
banking and branching laws favor small agri-
cultural banks.
These results reinforce implications from
the Economies, Hubbard, and Palia model
which suggest that interstate banking restric-
tions enhance the competitive position of
small banks. The empirical findings align with
those presented in Swamy et al. who found
that profits for commercial banks were higher
in states with substantial barriers to entry. Un-
der reciprocity regimes, the main driving force
of productivity change was technological
change. Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise noted
that technological and financial innovations,
including improvements in information pro-
cessing and telecommunications technologies,
plus the dramatic increases in automated teller
machines over this period played an important
role in transforming the banking industry.
These developments confirm the significant
role of technological change in productivity
growth. The changes in productivity and the
impact of the productivity components were
similar for both types of interstate banking
reciprocity laws. This suggests that there is lit-Armah, Park, and Lovell: Performance of Agricultural Bank Management 44’7
tle advantage in restricting interstate banking
to a smaller region rather than nationwide.
With no interstate banking entry (Table 4),
managerial productivity rose by 36.5 percent.
Technology improved at a high rate of 14.8
percent while the rate of technical efficiency
increase was lower at a rate of 3.2 percent.
These figures may reflect bank responses to
potential competition. For example in 1992,
Kansas and New Mexico were due to adopt
the regional and national reciprocity laws re-
spectively.
The third columns in each table shows the
indices of productivity change net of scale
economies and demonstrates the importance of
using the generalized Malmquist index for
evaluating productivity change in agricultural
banks. A value for the scale index greater than
unity indicates that a change in the producer’s
scale of production contributes positively to
productivity change. A positive contribution to
productivity results from expansion under in-
creasing returns or contraction of production
in the region of decreasing returns to scale.
These calculations demonstrate that ne-
glecting scale economies in measuring pro-
ductivity change in agricultural bank manage-
ment causes the actual productivity growth to
be understated for states with nationwide
open-entry where output growth occurred in
the presence of increasing returns to scale. For
states with some form of reciprocity law, pro-
ductivity growth net of scale economies over-
states actual growth in productivity since out-
puts expanded in the region of decreasing
returns to scale. A change in the scale of pro-
duction contributes to a decline in productivity
change if it is away from the direction of the
technically optimal scale.
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the
performance of agricultural bank management
from 1982 to 1991 facing different types of
interstate banking laws. A generalized Malm-
quist productivity index highlights the contri-
bution of scale economies to productivity
change. We evaluated the effects of shifts in
technical efficiency, technological change, and
the impact of scale economies on productivity
change in agricultural banks. The magnitudes
of these impacts are related to different types
of interstate banking regimes.
Results showed that managerial productiv-
ity change, measured by the generalized
Malmquist index, did increase over the period
by 39.3 percent. States that had adopted or
were about to adopt the most liberal interstate
banking laws experienced the most improve-
ment in productivity.
We observed an overall positive relation-
ship between agricultural bank size and pro-
ductivity. Large agricultural banks were more
efficient in states that had a more liberalized
interstate banking law while small agricultural
banks fared better in states with more restric-
tive laws. Neglecting the impacts of scale
economies on productivity change causes us
to understate actual productivity growth and
the efficacy of the generalized Malmquist in-
dex in eliminating this bias is confirmed in
evaluating productivity growth in states with
nationwide open-entry.
Interstate banking reforms enhance mana-
gerial productivity of agricultural banks and
allow managers to take advantage of econo-
mies of scale. Managers must also adopt more
efficient practices in the operation of small
banks. High costs of adjustment limit the abil-
ity of small banks to expand. For small agri-
cultural banks to survive in the more liberal-
ized markets, managers must operate more
efficiently by making use of specialized
knowledge about locaI clients.
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